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Political thought influenced by post-structuralism rarely invokes ideology critique as a 
meaningful category of analysis, criticising the structuralist attribution of contingency and 
necessity to, respectively, ideology and science. This article will challenge this position 
utilising recent philosophical considerations of necessity and contingency that rehabilitate 
ideology critique. Drawing on scientific materials, both Quentin Meillassoux and Catherine 
Malabou develop a form of necessity inhabited by contingency. It will be argued that this 
work allows a reconsideration of the usefulness of science for ideology critique in a manner 
that doesnÕt rely on an attribution of scientific necessity to the politics of the critic. 
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Science and Ideology Revisited: Necessity, Contingency and the 
Critique of Ideologies in Meillassoux and Malabou 
 
In political thought influenced by post-structuralism it is rare to see the concept of ideology, 
or the practice of ideology critique, invoked as meaningful categories of analysis.1 This 
reticence towards the Marxist conception of ideology, understood as the deliberate 
mystification and obscuring of a set of necessary political conditions, revolved around a 
rejection of the scientific ambitions of structuralism and its attempt to distinguish between 
contingent surfaces and deep, a-historical structures.2 Quintessential to this separation was 
the attribution of contingency and necessity to, respectively, ideology and science. Ideology 
critique was seen to purge politics of contingent ideological positions, making it fertile for 
historical materialismÕs scientific analysis of the necessary movement of history. 
Contrastingly, for the post-structuralists, political action rested not on a necessity determined 
by science but on the unpredictable and contingent character of both politics and history. In 
the cases where ideology is appealed to by thinkers influenced by post-structuralist thought, 
particularly those considered under the label of post-Marxism, it is untethered from notions 
of necessity and reduced to an arbitrary attempt at naming or totalising an otherwise 
contingent set of social relations in a manner which prevents this contingency from being 
recognised.3  
Critics of this influence of post-structuralism upon post-Marxist politics and theories 
of ideology have argued that the flight from scientific materialism prevents an understanding 
of the concrete conditions of politics and of how ideology operates.4 As a result, the 
rarefication or weakening of the concept of ideology in post-structuralism appears to be a 
result of this chasm between those that stress the contingency of politics and those that insist 
upon the scientific necessity of materialist analysis. Such a strict division between the 
positions of necessity and contingency leads to an impasse, however. For while the 
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dissolution of the problem of ideology within the concepts of discourse and power moves 
politics beyond teleological and determinist historicism, within this theoretical purview it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to disqualify false or misleading political beliefs and positions that 
nevertheless emerge from the productive conditions that post-structuralism tries to account 
for. How can one truly question deceptive political claims without at least a modicum of 
necessity upon which to ground such challenges? 
A solution to this problem can be found within the adoption of resources from science 
and the formulation of naturalistic positions by contemporary European philosophy.5 Political 
theorists who have been influenced by this turn to science can be divided into two camps. 
The first, often referred to as New Materialism, attempts to support post-structuralist 
ontological claims regarding the post-foundational character of being and the centrality of 
becoming by way of scientific materials.6 The second camp attempts to move away from 
these ontological claims in order to construct realist, speculative, and materialist positions 
that rehabilitate questions of necessity.7 This article will focus on the latter turn, in order to 
claim that the use of scientific materials in the work of Quentin Meillassoux and Catherine 
Malabou is significant for the concept of ideology.8 In particular, it will be argued that their 
work shows how a form of scientific necessity within ideology critique can be reconciled 
with post-structuralismÕs endorsement of political contingency.9 Their understandings of the 
relationship between necessity and contingency make considerable contributions towards a 
rehabilitation of both science and necessity as categories of political and ideological analysis, 
in a manner that is compatible with the crux of the post-structuralist critique of necessity in 
favour of contingency. The importance of these positions lies in the identification and 
criticism of illusory beliefs in a manner that the abandonment of ideology is incapable of, 
through an appeal to an underlying reality that is simultaneously necessary yet non-
essentialising, due to its contingency. 
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This claim that necessity and contingency are not so much opposed but are, in fact, 
compatible is central to the work of Meillassoux10 and Malabou.11 They both claim that 
contingency is necessary and that necessity can only be thought through contingency. Crucial 
to their respective efforts to develop this point is the use of scientific materials, in the form of 
transfinite mathematics and contemporary neuroscience, in a manner that rejects the political 
romanticism behind the post-structuralist reticence towards necessity. By doing so, their work 
restores the ability of ideology critique to appeal to the language of science in order to cut 
through the dross of ideological abstraction, while refusing to make the ground which one 
reveals absolutely necessary, thus avoiding the consequence that the post-structuralists were 
wary of. The argument presented here will, therefore, not focus on the general political 
arguments of both thinkers.12 Instead, it will demonstrate the significance of their work for 
the concept of ideology, insofar as they both suggest that the claims of science can be utilised 
in a form of political and ideological critique without the essentialist politics that post-
structuralism criticised. Instead, scientific evidence is seen to be both necessary, hence its 
ability to disable ideological claims, but contingent, insofar as the real that this evidence 
describes is open to change and transformation. 
This claim will be unfolded across four sections. The first will set the scene of the 
encounter between post-structuralism and ideology critique. Here, Louis Althusser will be 
taken to represent the attempt to characterise historical materialism as a scientific necessity 
underpinning the political contingency represented by ideology, before presenting the 
epistemological and ontological dimensions of the post-structuralist rejection of this claim. 
Sections two and three will present Meillassoux and MalabouÕs reconfiguration of the 
character of ideology critique through their use of science. The account of Meillassoux will 
focus upon his use of mathematics to critique what he sees as philosophyÕs replacement of 
objectivity with a proliferation of ideological beliefs based on faith alone. In the account of 
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Malabou we will see how she attempts to use the concept of neuronal plasticity to debunk the 
specific ideological adoption of neuroscience in the promotion of flexible working practices. 
In the fourth section, it will be concluded that in order to resist repeating the sins that the 
post-structuralists associated with necessity, neither approach can be taken in isolation. By 
tempering the individual claims of Meillassoux and Malabou to having found the correct 
approach to science, it will be argued that the contribution their work can make to the study 
of ideology is only significant when taken together. That is, if one conjoins necessity with 
contingency, a plurality of approaches to scientific modes of critique must be accommodated 
to best adapt to the different forms that ideology takes. 
The Post-Structuralist Rejection of Scientific Necessity Underneath Ideological 
Contingency 
 
It is important to note that ideology will not be understood as the neutral variation of 
political beliefs, but as a tool for the unmasking of deception and the distortion of reality.13 
This critical conception of ideology is first found in Marx, who adds a distinction between 
ideological surface and scientific depth to the science of ideas developed by Destutt de Tracy. 
This can be seen clearly in The German Ideology: 
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence 
of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances 
appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much 
from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from 
their physical life-process.14 
Combining the materialist connection between sensation and ideas of de Tracy with the 
inversion effected by the camera obscura, Marx conjoins the study of the source of 
consciousness with the need for critical scrutiny. Contingency and necessity are both 
implicated here. However, in contrast to the metaphysical or ontological conjoining of 
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contingency and necessity that we will see in Meillassoux and Malabou, Marx distinguishes 
between a political contingency and a philosophical-scientific necessity. Ideology is 
contingent insofar as it represents a political position that arises only Ô[a]fter conditions have 
developed sufficiently to produce itÕ.15 By situating ideology within history, Marx demands 
its contingency; it will not survive the travails of the passage of time as it emerged in time. 
Nevertheless, this claim is accompanied by the materialist study of the necessary aspects of 
historical development that led to the emergence of these contingent political positions. 
MarxÕs critique of HegelÕs Philosophy of Right is instructive here, insofar as the ideology of 
the state takes it to be Ôcreated by the actual idea,Õ whereas Marx conceives it as a contingent 
political concept that emerges from a set of material conditions that make it possible.16 Thus, 
as Nathan Coombs suggests, historical materialism attempts to maintain the contingency of 
abstract, political concepts without abdicating the role of explaining the concrete relations 
necessary for their emergence.17 Ideological mystification must be replaced by the analysis of 
the real, necessary conditions within which ideological consciousness is produced.  
Althusser is perhaps the major proponent of such an understanding of ideology in the 
twentieth century. By invoking the Ôactual life-processÕ of humans in The German Ideology, 
which becomes the analysis of modes of production in Capital, ÔMarx opened up the 
Òcontinent of historyÓ to scientific knowledgeÕ.18 Reading the Marx of these two texts 
together lays the ground for a properly scientific conception of how contingent ideologies 
transform across the passage of time.19 Three points of AlthusserÕs reading are pertinent here. 
First, ideology constitutes both an illusion with regards to material existence while also being 
based within it.20 Ideology is contingent with regards to reality, given its illusory nature, but 
is generated from a mode of production that can be thought scientifically. Second, given that 
both are products of material conditions, there is no subjectivity formed outside of ideology 
and its associated rituals, institutions and practices.21 By materialising the source of 
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ideological illusion, one can reconstruct the emergence of these contingencies through the 
scientific method of historical materialism. Third, while all subjectivity is related to a 
contingent ideological viewpoint, Marxist historical materialism is capable of acting as an 
ideology informed by the necessity of history: 
Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist political ideology is of course distinguished 
by the fact, without historical precedent, that it is an ideology which has been 
heavily 'reworked', and thus transformed, by a science, the Marxist science of 
history.22 
Althusser attributed contingency to ideological formations by showing, scientifically, how 
they can be reduced to the necessary development of the materialist interpretation of history. 
Ideology critique is thus situated within the unique position of the Marxist-Leninist critic 
with regards to contingency and necessity, insofar as its own contingency as a political 
position is tempered by knowledge of scientific necessity. 
The problem that arises from the Althusserian transformation of the Marxist project is 
that it attributes a contingent political position with the status of a necessary principle. A key 
founding principle of post-structuralism was a rejection of this apportioning of necessity and 
contingency, which Franois Dosse characterises as an Ôideological detergent in the name of 
scienceÕ that endowed Ôpolitical commitment with a truly scientific exigency that, in its 
purity, resembled a metaphysical desire for an absoluteÕ.23 It is the absolute, abstract and 
metaphysical character of this scientific necessity underlying contingent ideological 
articulations, and therefore the political position that one should adopt, that caught in the 
throat of post-structuralist thinkers.24 The attribution of scientific necessity to the structures 
underlying ideological contingency was questioned in two ways. First, through an 
epistemological claim that the division between science and ideology impairs the analysis of 
the real operations of power. Second, by staking an ontological position that sees the division 
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between ideological contingency and materialist necessity as an incorrect view on the 
character of reality. 
 Both of these claims are present in the work of Michel Foucault. He refuses a-
historical concepts in a manner that positions the attribution of scientific necessity to Marxist 
ideology critique as an instance of theorists attempting to play the Ôrole of referee, judge and 
universal witnessÕ.25 Foucault gives three reasons for this which form the epistemological and 
an ontological rejections of Marxist ideology critique.26 The first two clearly highlight the 
epistemological problem. First, the duality between science and ideology rests too heavily on 
a-historical categories of true and false that his genealogical method problematised, which, 
second, assumes the existence of an a-historical subject that would be subjected to the 
operations of ideology. By forming genealogies of the emergence of concepts and practices 
which resisted their reduction to clear origins, Foucault challenged both, in Michle BarrettÕs 
words, the ÔÒrealistÓ epistemology on which the ideology/science distinctionÉhas been 
founded,Õ and the existence of a trans-historical subject that would engage in the critique of 
ideologies.27 FoucaultÕs third criticism expresses the ontological problem with the division 
between science and ideology, in that it reduces the question of ideology to a system of 
economic and material structures that play a repressive function with regards to individuals. 
This obscures the ontological role of power, insofar as it is not something that is wielded 
repressively so much as a set of relations that produce both ideological structures and the 
scientific ÔtruthsÕ which underlie them. Rather than a distinction between contingent 
ideological surface and necessary scientific depth, the post-structuralist position on ideology, 
shared with Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, is that the truth underling ideological illusion 
is as much a contingent product of power as the mystification itself.28 
The reticence towards the concept of ideology, therefore, rests on the claim that it 
makes the investigation of power and its operations difficult, as it invokes a-historical 
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conceptions of truth, the subject, and determining structure in its postulation of scientific 
necessity. For Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari dualistic divisions between science and 
ideology cannot account for the real conditions that produce political problems without 
attributing necessity to the politics held by the critic. This is not an exhaustive account of the 
post-structuralist position with regards to ideology, nor the connected questions of power, 
domination and control that ideology critique addresses. What it is intended to present, 
however, is a particular historical and theoretical moment in which contingency was 
mobilised against the power of necessity in politics, a casualty of which was the efficacy of 
the concept of ideology. It is to this historical moment, and its re-apportioning of the 
importance of contingency and necessity, that the work of Meillassoux and Malabou can be 
seen to respond. 
MeillassouxÕs Rehabilitation of Necessity Against Ideological Fideism 
 
 
The crux of this post-structuralist criticism of Marxist ideology critique is a rejection 
of its key metaphysical commitments, particularly the attribution of teleological inevitability 
to the processes studied by historical materialism.29 If we define metaphysics as the idea that 
some entities exist necessarily, then the post-structuralist claim is, at its core, a criticism of 
the metaphyscial necessity implied by the political position that articulates a scientific 
critique of ideological contingency. Such is how Meillassoux defines metaphysics, as the 
attempt discover a necessary reason or entity that must exist (AF p. 33). He would also, 
however, class the post-structuralists discussed above as metaphysicians in this traditional 
sense, insofar as the position that is taken against the science/ideology division relies upon 
the necessity of a commitment to a particular conception of power, a flat ontology, and a 
principle of becoming that would replace dialectical materialismÕs distinction between 
surface and depth (AF p. 37).30 Meillassoux would not consider Foucault, Deleuze and 
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Guattari as anti-metaphysicians precisely because this would require them rejecting any 
necessary entity or law, represented for him by the metaphysical postulate of becoming or the 
productivity of power.31 
This wrangling over the definition of metaphysics is politically important, as it puts 
the critique of ideology in an advantageous position with regards to its post-structuralist 
critics. If we consider the critique of metaphysics as the critique of the postulation of 
necessary entities, it must also be a critique of ideology, insofar as ideology posits the 
necessary existence of particular political claims. Hence, for Meillassoux the critique of 
ideology Ôalways consists in demonstrating that a social situation which is presented as 
inevitable is actually contingentÕ and Ôis essentially indissociable from the critique of 
metaphysics, the latter being understood as the illusory manufacturing of necessary entitiesÕ 
(AF, p. 34). The political position of the post-structuralist anti-ideologists is turned on its 
head: if one is to truly critique traditional metaphysics, then this must also be a critique of 
ideology. Accordingly, it is possible to develop a critique of ideology tied to a critique of 
necessary entities, and thus untethered from the false necessity that the post-structuralists 
perceived in the scientific model of critique. Meillassoux wants, therefore, to return to a 
broadly Marxist conception of ideology as the distortion of real conditions, but while tying 
the necessity of these conditions to contingency.32  
Such a rethinking of the notion of necessity is one of the central motivations of 
MeillassouxÕs re-orientation of the stakes of European philosophy that leads to the 
ideological and political ramifications we will derive from his work. The distinction between 
MeillassouxÕs rejection of necessity and that of the post-structuralists is that he seeks to 
reconcile the absolute with such a critique. His primary target in this project, rather than 
ideology, is what he sees as the major philosophical commitment organising philosophy since 
Immanuel Kant, which he terms correlationism.33 For Meillassoux, Kant claimed that it is 
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only by way of the correlation between thought and being that philosophy can access reality, 
ruling out any objective proof of the existence of necessary entities. Despite being formative 
of the critique of metaphysicsÐand thus ideology critique in a Marxist keyÐthis cancelling out 
of any postulation of necessity leads to the political problem that Meillassoux refers to as 
fideism. This is the proliferation of ideologies not based on any claim to objectivity, but 
instead on fanaticism and nave faith, precisely because there is no absolute metaphysical 
principle with which one can adjudicate between beliefs and political positions.34 A renewed 
critique of necessity must be accompanied by a form of the absolute that prevents the 
legitimation of ideological fideism. The contagion of unjustified political belief is what 
Meillassoux challenges, and what he sees as the stakes of a theory of ideology elaborated 
after its post-structuralist critique. 
Such a view requires the defence of the apparently paradoxical attempt to 
simultaneously uphold a rejection of necessity and an embrace of the absolute. It is in 
MeillassouxÕs solution to this problem that the justification for his diagnosis of the present as 
a time of political fanaticism and the return of the religious is to be found, a claim which rests 
heavily on his characterisation of correlationism. This position, which typifies the majority of 
post-Kantian philosophy for Meillassoux, Ôconsists in disqualifying the claim that it is 
possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one anotherÕ 
(AF, p. 5). The two major aspects of this position are the correlationist circle and the 
correlationist two step. Indicating a paradox whereby we cannot escape the correlate to think 
the real in-itself, the correlationist circle claims that whenever we try to think the real 
objectively we are always doing this from within thought, rather than by way of direct access 
to objects themselves. Correlationists close this circle with a Ôtwo-stepÕ whereby subject and 
object are not only inconceivable outside of thought, but they are seen to be co-given or co-
constituted. These moves prohibit the possibility of any verification or objectivity as they 
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occur within thought, and consequently they make impossible any absolute form of 
objectivity outside of its subjective apprehension. 
MeillassouxÕs challenge to correlationism arises from what he calls the ancestral. 
Referring to events occurring anterior to the existence of any consciousness, such as the big-
bang or the fossil record, ancestrality poses the problem of knowing a reality prior to the 
correlate between thinking and being. This presents us with the notion that Ô[t]o think 
ancestrality is to think a world without thoughtÐa world without the givenness of the worldÕ, 
and that to produce statements that refer to the ancestral Ô[i]t is therefore incumbent upon us 
to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which to be is to be a 
correlateÕ (AF, p. 28). Scientific validity with regards to the ancestral is at stake here, for the 
difficulty correlation presents, according to Meillassoux, is that the de-absolutisation of 
philosophy replaces verification with belief. How can we scientifically validate phenomena 
that occurred before the emergence of the correlate between thought and being? Significantly 
for those of us interested less in the study of physics or geology and more in political 
phenomena, not only does this critique apply to those things considered as ancestral, but also 
to statements about reality in general, social and political phenomena included. Without a 
foothold outside of consciousness or intentionality it is impossible for the correlationist to 
discern between true and false claims. We are thus led into a blind alley with regards to truth, 
where one cannot rule out any belief regarding the character of reality on account of our 
inability to escape the correlation. Politics, therefore, is hampered by the inability to rule out 
illegitimate, false, or misled ideological claims by appeal to some objectivity that persists 
beyond their contingent positions. 
Meillassoux thus situates both the founding of ideology critique and the proliferation 
of ideologies in the replacement of necessity with belief in the Kantian challenge of dogmatic 
metaphysics. On the one hand, correlationism Ôundermines reasonÕs claim to be able to 
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disqualify a belief on the grounds that its content is unthinkableÕ (AF, p. 40). One cannot 
disqualify an ideology with reference to a necessary ground because access to necessity is 
barred by the correlate. On the other hand, Ôthis trajectory culminates in the disappearance of 
the pretension to think any absolutes, but not in the disappearance of absolutesÕ (AF, p. 44). 
Ideology critique can no longer identify the necessity beneath contingency, and as such this 
void is filled by a proliferation of absolute beliefs without justification. This return of 
absolutes means that Ô[t]he victorious critique of ideologies has been transformed into a 
renewed argument for blind faithÕ (AF, p. 49). Faith, whether regarding explicitly religious 
themes or in the secular promise of the nation or the people, may not be able ground itself in 
necessity but nevertheless projects itself as doing so. 
 MeillassouxÕs attempt to dissolve this problem does not simply return to a pre-
Kantian position that states the necessity of a particular entity. To do so would be to return to 
the privileging of a single political position so cogently critiqued by post-structuralism. 
Instead, what makes MeillassouxÕs argument compelling is his attempt to reconcile necessity 
with contingency. There are two steps of this argument that are pertinent for us here. The first 
is the development of the principle of factiality. Correlationism rests upon the principle of 
facticity, that we cannot propose necessary entities because this takes place within thought. 
Absent of a direct connection to reality, whatever appears within thinking is always 
possessed by the possibility that it is actually other than it is merely thought to be. 
MeillassouxÕs move is to claim that this is not so much a characteristic of thought so much as 
a characteristic of reality (AF, p. 53). He claims that we must conceive of this Ôcapacity-to-
be-otherÕ as a character of a reality independent and indifferent to human thought because the 
capacity for change attributed to thought harbours the possibility of thought itself 
disappearing (AF, p. 57). Facticity cannot account for contingency because that which thinks 
the contingent could disappear as a result of contingency, whereas factiality transfers this 
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capacity to things in themselves and can, therefore, account for the possibility of thoughtÕs 
disappearance. 
To prevent this ability to become other from postulating a necessary principle for such 
an occurrence, the absolute contingency of all things replaces the principle of reason with a 
principle of unreason. Unreason refers to the fact that for Meillassoux there is no reason that 
the character of the natural laws that govern the world would not change at any particular 
moment. Crucially, this is distinct from the contingency attributed to probability, for the latter 
operates within the bounds of existing natural laws. This applies just as much to the alternate 
metaphysical and ontological principles advocated by post-structuralists that, while asserting 
the contingency of the state of things, ground this capacity within a necessary ontological 
principle.35 Contingency is not the becoming of laws so much as the possibility for their 
abrupt transformation at any instant, as Ôfar from guaranteeing order it guarantees only the 
possible destruction of every orderÕ (AF, p. 64). Ideology is thus the obscuring or denial that 
all things have the condition to be otherwise than they are. 
One objection to this argument is that if natural laws are contingent, then why do they 
not change continuously and as such demonstrate at least a degree of stability? Consequently, 
the second part of MeillassouxÕs step beyond correlationism accounts for this problem 
through a mathematising of the absolute which is able to account for the possibility of the co-
existence of the necessity of contingency and the stability of the laws of nature that currently 
exist.36 Meillassoux utilises the mathematics of the transfinite in order to deepen the 
distinction between probability and absolute contingency. Transfinite mathematics rests on 
the detotalisation of number, which claims that it is impossible to totalise the thinkable (AF, 
p. 103). The basic point here is intuitive; the totalisation of number is impossible precisely 
because that totalisation would itself require a set or series within which it is encompassed, 
which leads to an infinite regress of totalisations. Being is contingent precisely because it is 
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impossible totalise the absolute. The argument that the stability of natural laws contravenes 
the necessity of contingency fails, according to Meillassoux, because it rests on a conception 
of probability that the transfinite rules out. Reasoning through probability, the critic of 
necessary contingency argues that in the face of an infinite number of possibilities it is highly 
improbable that the laws of nature would not change (AF, p. 99). Contrarily, Meillassoux 
claims that thinking contingency through such probability requires the a priori possibility of 
totalisation that the transfinite denies. Stability is not more probable or improbable than 
instability, putting contingency beyond the bounds of the thinkable.37 
This claim regarding probability leads us to the point at which the use of a scientific 
discourse, transfinite mathematics, justifies MeillassouxÕs reconsideration of ideology. 
Mathematics is weaponised against the proliferation of ideological faith precisely because it 
allows him to bring the absolute back into play, demonstrating the necessity of contingency. 
Such a thought is provided by mathematisation, as the transfinite allows one to situate 
mathematical theorems within a particular totality without asserting the necessity of that 
totality. Hence, necessary contingency can be utilised within a critique of fideism by 
providing the grounds for the rejection of unwarranted ideological beliefs by reconciling 
necessity and contingency. Such necessity makes it possible to ground ideological critique in 
a scientific and mathematic conception of the real as necessary and contingent at the same 
time. This rehabilitates the critique of ideology, for the claim of a realm outside of political 
and subjective contestation that we can use to adjudicate between these beliefs is given 
credence.38 Thinking the outside of ideology is made possible by linking science to ideology 
through mathematics, absolutising nothing but contingency. 
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Biological Contingency, Plastic Necessity and Neuronal Ideology 
 
Mathematics is pivotal for MeillassouxÕs account of the necessary contingency of the 
absolute, and his version of the reconnection between science and ideology critique. 
Conversely, Malabou challenges this gesture in order to articulate her own counter-claim that 
it is a biological account of thought that can better account for the necessary contingency of 
nature. For her:  
the concept of a possible variability or modifiability in the laws of nature is 
not attained via a mathematical reading deprived of phenomenal proofs, but is 
based instead on the biological theory of heritageÉcontingency derives not 
from an axiomÐwhose origin is obviously always a prioriÐbut instead from the 
idea of a constitution of the a priori itself by experience and adaption (BT, p. 
149). 
Malabou makes this comparison between her own understanding of contingency and 
MeillassouxÕs in the context of her re-reading of the conditions of thought according to Kant 
in terms of neuro-biology. She shares MeillassouxÕs goal of bringing contingency beyond 
Ôthe dice throwÕ of probability, but rather than mathematising the absolute contingency of the 
laws of nature she develops an Ôepigenetic structure of the realÕ that rests upon Ôthe adaptive 
pliability of the worldÕ (BT, p. 151). We will see what epigenesis means in this context 
shortly, but the claim she articulates is that there is a necessary structure that determines the 
understanding, but that this is generated through the contingencies of history. Ideology 
critique can appeal to necessary a priori criteria for determining the truth or falsity of belief, 
but on the condition that these are open to change. 
 Malabou thus attempts to reconcile necessity and contingency, but from the 
perspective of a biological explanation of the emergence of the workings of the mind. Her 
own framing of the problem she addresses is remarkably to similar to MeillassouxÕs: ÔThe 
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question that life asks thought is about necessity defined as transcendental contingencyÕ (BT, 
p. 172). This statement rests on a condensation of MalabouÕs engagement with several 
concepts, most notably the project which the majority of her philosophical career has 
revolved around: the reconciliation of a philosophical notion of plasticity with the 
understanding of plasticity developed within neuroscience. Ideology features here not only 
because her characterisation of plasticity is invoked in her critique of its ideological 
deployment by contemporary capitalism. Significantly, her turn to science underpins a more 
general re-conception of the relationship between necessity and contingency of the kind that 
this argument suggests supersedes the political critique of the concept of ideology articulated 
by post-structuralism. In other words, she makes it possible to reconcile ideology critique 
with science by making the necessity revealed by the latter a contingent structure upon which 
the former operates. 
 For Malabou, plasticity refers to the mutable, transformable and destructive character 
of reality. Behind all her engagements with both philosophy and neuroscience is an attempt to 
elaborate Ôthe differentiated structure of all form and hence the formal or figurative unity of 
all difference and articulationÕ.39 She develops an understanding of plasticity as, on the one 
hand, the capacity of all form to be subject to transformation, and on the other, the necessity 
of persistent structures as the site of any transformation. This is significant for two reasons. 
First, because it rejects the primacy of heterogeneity and difference upheld by post-
structuralism, putting contingent transformation and the necessity of structure on a level 
footing. Second, because this return to the notion of form echoes MeillassouxÕs call for a 
return to necessity, while subjecting that necessity to contingency. The necessity of structure 
is the result of a set of plastic transformations, but such structures are necessary for any 
contingent alteration of their reality. A clear definition of plasticity runs as follows: 
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Plasticity refers to an equilibrium between the receiving and giving of form. It 
is understood as a sort of natural sculpting that forms our identity, an identity 
modelled by experience and that makes us subjects of a history, a singular, 
recognizable, identifiable history, with all its events, gaps, and future.40  
MalabouÕs project, therefore, is to think the mutability of structures such as the 
transcendental, and thus the contingency of the necessary forms that govern our lives. 
Significantly, for Malabou plasticity is not just the positive production and alteration 
of these forms; it is caught within a dialectic that oscillates between production and 
destruction. Destructive plasticity refers to the annihilation of any form involved in plastic 
transformation. Plasticity is not simply a reversible transition between stable forms, but 
instead incorporates destruction and irreversibility into the very capacity to receive form. 
PlasticityÕs powers of formation are reliant on the destruction of what has come before, and 
the contingency of destructive plasticity haunts any apparently necessary form. MalabouÕs 
reading of Darwin in terms of destructive plasticity is telling on this point. She writes that: 
The plastic conditionÐotherwise called the motor of evolution itselfÐtherefore hinges 
on plasticity, understood as the fluidity of structures on the one hand and the selection 
of viable, durable forms likely to constitute a legacy or lineage on the other.41 
Natural selection acts as an apt demonstration of this necessity of destruction through the 
eradication of traits and individuals that occurs in the formation of the positive characteristics 
of species. Plasticity is not just a positive agent of change but a harbinger of destruction that 
incorporates contingency with the structure of reality.  
MalabouÕs further innovation lies in her sustained attempt to draw on neuroscience to 
substantiate her claims with regards to plasticity. Two particular aspects of this engagement 
are of major importance for her relevance to the concept of ideology. The first is developed 
early in MalabouÕs use of research regarding the plastic formation of the brain. Developments 
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in neuroscience, which are fast becoming commonly held, suggest that the brain is not 
possessed of any linear process of development, but has the capacity to form itself according 
to a principle of plasticity. It gives form in the process of its development, modulates the 
formation of synapses according to individual experience, and has the capacity to repair 
lesions to its physical structure.42 Not only does the brain develop according to a principle of 
plasticity in its capacity for form and repair, but its formation is implicated in its environment 
and is not purely genetically determined.43 There is, as a result, always some form of plastic 
contingency involved in the formation of the brain. 
 This reference to the environment moves us to the second of MalabouÕs engagements 
with contemporary neuroscience. In more recent work, she has developed her focus on 
plasticity in terms of the historical development of the structure of rationality by rooting it 
within the science of epigenetics. Simply, epigenetics resists the strict determinism implied 
by the genetic paradigm, replacing it with a view where the evolution of life is implicated 
with environmental and individual factors that influence the unfolding and transformation of 
the genetic program. This development constitutes Ôa break with innatismÕ whereby the 
stakes are the dissolution of the philosophical problem of rationality within a biological 
explanation (BT, p. 11). Malabou, however, resists this conclusion. Through a dense tracing 
of the meanings of the metaphor of epigenesis in the work of Kant, she builds a bridge 
between biological development and the transcendental structure of reason. In Ian JamesÕ 
words, for Malabou Ôthe a priori structure of thought must be understood as being folded into 
the temporal and material becoming of epigenetic developmentÕ.44 Reason exists but is 
without reason; it has form but no necessity, and is necessary but contingent. 
 This elaboration of neuronal plasticity lends itself to ideology critique in two ways, 
both different from the sense in which ideological concerns arise in the work of Meillassoux. 
The first regards a specific ideological target, the tendency of contemporary capitalism to 
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produce flexible subjects and a labour market that adapts spontaneously to its needs. Malabou 
distinguishes flexibility from plasticity, as the former concerns the ability to receive rather 
than give form.45 From this distinction, she derives three consequences of the false echoing of 
neuronal plasticity by this focus on flexibility within contemporary economic practices.46 
First, an emphasis on networked production and management resonates with the networks of 
neuronal connections produced by the plastic brain. Nevertheless, the potential to form and 
reform these networks is not distributed among them, and a central model of control is 
retained. Second, this entails a delocalisation of work. Where neurons are multifunctional in 
the model of plasticity, employees are expected to be part of a process of constant 
refunctionalisation and relocation to fit the needs of the networked business while retaining 
the capacity to return to the previous state that flexibility demands. Third, these two 
characteristics rely on the principle of adaption. Like the ability of the brain to adapt 
ÔplasticallyÕ to its environment and experience, the employee must be able to adapt in order 
to offer something to their employers in response to a constantly changing workplace. 
Malabou identifies these three principles with what she sees as the ideological 
misrepresentation of plasticity as flexibility, wherein Ôit is no longer possible to distinguish 
rigorously on an ideological level between "popularly" accessible neuroscientific studies and 
the literature of managementÕ.47 It is through her adoption of scientific materials that 
Malabou is able to assert the falsity of this particular ideological misrepresentation. 
 Important here is not just the content of this critique but MalabouÕs turn to science for 
its elaboration. The specific claim made in the differentiation of plasticity from flexibility is 
that Ôany vision of the brain is necessarily politicalÕ.48 The key to debunking the contingency 
of one specific, contemporary ideology lies in the more general adoption of the necessity of 
the scientific investigation of the plastic structure of the brain for this critique. By making 
this link, we can see that the second consequence for the concept of ideology is implied rather 
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than explicit, and lies in MalabouÕs arguments regarding the relationship of necessity to 
contingency. Malabou conjoins the necessary structure of reason with the potential for 
change according to the principles of plasticity and epigenetics (BT, p. 174). The critique of 
the contingent ideology of flexibility reveals the necessary truth of plasticity, but one that has 
only come into being on the basis of an epigenetic process. Hence, the very categories and 
concepts by which we articulate such an ideological critique are themselves subject to 
contingency while also possessing a scientific status. Thus, while Malabou articulates a 
specific critique of the ideology of flexibility, she makes it possible to conceive of a scientific 
critique of ideology in general, wherein what lies beneath the ideological surface is only 
necessary insofar as it is contingently formed. 
One or Many Paths to Utilising Science in Ideology Critique? 
 
  
It is worth pausing to clarify the forms of contingency at stake here. We began with 
the distinction between political contingency and scientific ideology as expressed by Marx 
and Althusser, which Foucault criticised in the name of the contingency of both politics and 
science. In order to restore necessity to the critique of ideology, we saw how it is confined 
within a form of contingency by both Meillassoux and Malabou. As a result of this account of 
their work, we might suggest that Meillassoux asserts the necessity of contingency whereas 
Malabou asserts the contingency of necessity. While this may seem like a minor quibble over 
emphasis, this difference points to the opposing paths that Meillassoux and Malabou take 
towards the re-unification of ideology critique and scientific materials. Meillassoux, on the 
one hand, aligns ideology critique with his renewed anti-metaphysical project grounded in 
transfinite mathematics and its necessary axiom of contingency. Contingency is mobilised as 
a path to rethinking the absolute and unchanging principles ordering reality, which turn out to 
be nothing but infinite changeability. Malabou, on the other hand, asserts the contingency of 
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any necessity by way of plasticity and epigenetic mutability. By integrating neuroscience and 
philosophy, she attempts to account for the contingent emergence of a necessary 
transcendental structure. For Meillassoux, contingency is a singular, necessary principle that 
is unaffected by history, whereas for Malabou many necessary principles are subject to the 
contingent movements of history.  
Additional clarity can be gained here by noting the apparent proximity of the above 
distinction between Meillassoux and Malabou, as endorsing the necessity of contingency and 
the contingency of necessity respectively, to MeillassouxÕs own distinction between himself 
and the work of Alain Badiou.49 Badiou is seen, by Meillassoux, to assert the contingent 
emergence of necessary truths, whereas Meillassoux would reject the necessity of these 
truths.50 Despite her similar advocation of the contingency of necessity, MalabouÕs work 
cannot be reduced to BadiouÕs position for two reasons. First, with respect to Badiou alone, 
her position rejects the necessity of axiomatic truths that consist beyond and come to 
interrupt history.51 Instead, necessity is formed within the contingencies of history. Second, 
while Meillassoux distinguishes between himself and Badiou, both are opposed to Malabou 
insofar as she endorses biological contingency over mathematical necessity. The difference at 
stake between Malabou and Meillassoux, therefore, is the distinction between an axiomatic, 
mathematical necessity of contingency and a transcendental necessity that is explained by its 
emergence, modification, and possible disappearance, within history.52 
This articulation of the difference between their projects is sustained by Meillassoux 
and Malabou themselves, insofar as both claim that their positions are mutually exclusive. 
Meillassoux rejects the use of biology in his speculative project while Malabou denies 
mathematics the capacity to think the contingent. This oppositional posturing moves both 
close to expressing ideology rather than critiquing it, and they veer dangerously near to 
falling back into nave ideological positions by militating for their particular conception of 
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science. The political consequence for both thinkers would be to move back to the 
conjunction of necessity and politics that post-structuralism highlighted as the danger of the 
concept of ideology. If this is the case, their metaphysical considerations of the relationship 
between necessity and contingency appear close to the differentiation of political contingency 
from historical-materialist scientific necessity seen in Marx and Althusser. For Coombs, 
AlthusserÕs distinction between science and ideology rests on circular reasoning as it 
provides no justification, beyond asserting the authority of the theoretician, for its conception 
of what is conceived of as science, a sin that he claims is also committed by Badiou and 
Meillassoux.53 From our perspective, this circularity is repeated by both Meillassoux and 
Malabou insofar as their adjudication on what counts as the valid scientific derivation of 
contingency rests solely on philosophical authority. Again, science appears to be just as 
contingent as the political positions that Marx and Althusser categorised as ideological, as 
suggested by Foucault. 
If their interventions in the name of science are, therefore, political, we might direct at 
Meillassoux and Malabou a question that Georges Canguilhem posed to Althusser. This is 
whether it is Ôpossible to apply the name of "science" to a type of theoretical production in 
which politics is ultimately determining.Õ54 To what extent do political and philosophical 
commitments take precedence over scientific ones? Such militancy can be expanded upon by 
comparing their positions to what Canguilhem referred to as Ôscientific ideologyÕ. He defined 
scientific ideologies using three characteristics: 
a. Scientific ideologies are explanatory systems that stray beyond their own 
borrowed norms of scientificity. 
b. In every domain scientific ideology precedes the institution of science. 
Similarly, every ideology is preceded by a science in an adjunct domain that 
falls obliquely within the ideology's field of view. 
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c. Scientific ideology is not to be confused with false science, magic, or 
religion. Like them, it derives its impetus from an unconscious need for direct 
access to the totality of being, but it is a belief that squints at an already 
instituted science whose prestige it recognizes and whose style it seeks to 
imitate.55  
We will take Meillassoux and MalabouÕs positions in turn to see how they conform to these 
principles, in order to suggest in conclusion that neither provides an independent, and hence 
a-political, way to connect science and ideology in a way that solves the concerns of the post-
structuralists. It will be suggested that in order to do so, they must be taken together to 
maintain distance between their respective approaches to ideology and the political 
consequences of ideology critique that were highlighted by post-structuralism. 
First, as Adrian Johnston notes, the epistemic ramifications of MeillassouxÕs use of 
mathematics have little bearing on the actual practice of science.56 While he might begin 
from axioms established by transfinite mathematics, these do not impact upon the toil of 
actual scientific practice that is unaffected by the discovery of the absolute nature of 
contingency. It is in this sense that Meillassoux could be said to stray beyond the established 
norms of the science he is working with, by assuming a broader set of ramifications from his 
philosophical use of mathematics than those that would concern scientific practice. Second, 
we might ask to what extent there is an ideology of the transfinite that precedes and taints 
MeillassouxÕs adoption of mathematics. Johnston also suggests that MeillassouxÕs abstraction 
of quantification from any material history or account of the techniques that formed it 
constitutes an a-historical and ideological view of the transfinite, putting science in 
MeillassouxÕs view Ôobliquely,Õ to use CanguilhemÕs term.57 By ignoring the material history 
within which transfinite mathematics emerged, does Meillassoux not view it from within the 
camera obscura that Marx describes? Even more damningly, it would appear that for 
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MeillassouxÕs argument to hold, the logical laws by which he derives the necessity of 
contingency would need to be immune from a sudden transformation as a result of the whims 
of contingency.58 His use of mathematics becomes ideological in that it appears untethered 
from history and exempt from the necessity of contingency that it describes. Lastly, 
MeillassouxÕs project of re-absolutising philosophy aims precisely at the totality of being that 
Canguilhem describes in his third condition for scientific ideology. By deploying 
mathematics in his attempt to reach this absolute, one might question the philosophical 
demonstrability of the totalising conclusions he paradoxically draws from the non-totalisible 
transfinite.59 
On the face of it, MalabouÕs work seems better positioned to resist the label of 
scientific ideology, particularly because she tries to deal directly with the popular, ideological 
image of plasticity. Nevertheless, her rejection of non-biological concepts of contingency 
suggest a fanaticism of plasticity. If CanguilhemÕs first criterion for defining scientific 
ideology refers to the pushing of scientific findings beyond their validity, then one might 
pose the question as to whether MalabouÕs transposition of neuronal plasticity to ontological 
plasticity does precisely this. While she may refer to different registers of plasticity, and thus 
of contingency and necessity, the equivalence she establishes between these realms is a claim 
that neuroscientists would be reticent to make. In other words, is plasticity a convenient 
metaphor that in MalabouÕs system is presented as indefatigable scientific truth? Second, and 
similarly, while Malabou critiques the ideological representation of neuronal plasticity, her 
work is missing a critical analysis of the social conditions within which the science of 
plasticity emerged, particularly given that these are precisely the same capitalist conditions 
that she critiques. By assuming the mirroring of the brain by contemporary capitalist 
economics, as Alberto Toscano has claimed, she gives too much and not enough to the 
conditions of capitalism.60 On the one hand, she assumes that capitalism, if the use of that 
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noun in the singular is not enough of a giveaway, articulates a monolithic ideological 
deception with regards to the brain. On the other, she does not analyse the historical 
conditions, that have largely been subsumed by the various histories of capitalism, in which 
neuronal plasticity emerged as a concept. Thus, Malabou does not devote much time to this 
ideological history, and holds neuroscience in her view obliquely due to this contextual 
omission. Third, as a result it would appear that Malabou, in some sense, ÔsquintsÕ at the 
totality of being by imitating plasticity. In the same way that MeillassouxÕs attempt to 
produce an absolutism via a non-totalising scientific method, Malabou takes a regional 
ontological discourse and applies it to being in general. It is this shuttling between general 
and local ontological claims that unsettles MalabouÕs aim to escape the ideological 
presentation of plasticity. 
As such, aligning a renewed philosophy of necessary contingency or contingent 
necessity with either mathematics or biology alone runs the risk of sectarianising and reifying 
such positions in precisely the manner that Canguilhem describes. By tethering ideology 
critique to the yoke of either mathematics or biology, we arrive back at precisely the political 
problem that the post-structuralists identified with the structuralist version of the dichotomy 
between science and ideology given by Althusser. Necessity is attributed to one particular 
form of criticism, and therefore one form of politics, over the false contingency of ideological 
abstraction. Initially, it would seem that this problem vindicates the post-structuralist 
rejection of ideology critique in the name of contingency, and the uptake of this position in 
the post-Marxist version of ideology. Ideology is conceived of as the ongoing attempt to 
totalise a particular set of social relations precisely because there is no ÔobjectiveÕ standpoint 
from which the contestation of the political can be viewed.61 From this position, and from the 
position elaborated above by way of Canguilhem, the claims of Meillassoux and Malabou 
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appear to be ideological in their very nature, due to their positing of an objective political 
position by which other ideologies can be judged. 
To move beyond this problem, it is necessary to overcome the strict dichotomy 
between Meillassoux and Malabou. Communication between the differences in their 
articulation of the relationships between science and ideology and necessity and contingency 
is central to recognising the materials that science can provide for ideology critique in the 
present. The first difference concerns the position of science with regards to their respective 
arguments. Meillassoux aims at a rehabilitation of science through the establishment of the 
scientific status of mathematics by way of a philosophical rehabilitation of necessity, whereas 
Malabou seeks to demonstrate the necessity of a renewed relationship between continental 
philosophy and science. One seeks to use philosophy to re-invigorate scientific claims to 
truth through the necessity of contingency, while the other uses the truth claims of science to 
articulate the contingency of their necessity. These two strategies are not mutually exclusive. 
Attention to both the philosophical conditions of scientific claims and the way in which those 
claims have ramifications for philosophical and political investigation can enlighten each 
other considerably. For the ideology critic, utilising both of these approaches can help 
consider the conditions of the scientific evidence mobilised against the political positions of 
particular ideologies, and the way in which that evidence may have a recursive impact upon 
the conceptualisation of their conditions, and so on. The relationship between science and 
ideology would not take on the attribution of a necessity underlying contingency as the post-
structuralists identified, but an interplay between the necessity established by scientific 
conditions, the philosophically elaborated contingency of those conditions, and the political 
analysis of the ideologies that arise from them.  
Second, this has ramifications for the sectarianism that both Meillassoux and Malabou 
take towards the scientific traditions that they do not adopt. Meillassoux is reticent towards 
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biological contingency, while Malabou adopts the same attitude towards mathematics. Their 
commitment to the veridical character of the scientific claims they mobilise is precisely what 
Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari were wary of in the concept of ideology, precisely because it 
has the danger of homogenising the political response adopted in the face of ideological 
distortion. This situation can be reversed, however, if one takes these scientific claims to 
enlighten one another in terms of the particular problems that they can address. Rather than 
returning us to the relativism of fideism that Meillassoux takes issue with, this allows one to 
ground the critique of contingent ideologies through an open, rather than sectarian, approach 
to science. The dichotomy between science and ideology does not have to lead to militancy 
but an articulation of necessity that pays heed to the contingency of its particular version of 
truth.  
In turn, the mathematics of the transfinite and the biological claims of neuroscience 
can play distinct and complementary roles with regards to debunking, respectively, fideism 
and the capitalist exploitation of neuroplasticity. Seeing them as such aids the development of 
a new relationship between ideology and science because it rejects the two problems that 
post-structuralism identified; on the one hand, a single scientific necessity underlying 
ideology, and, on the other, the reification of a monolithic ideological edifice that obscures 
the real operations of power. MeillassouxÕs critique of fideismÕs dissemination of ideological 
belief complements MalabouÕs critique of the flexible image of the human subject; the 
slipperiness of facts accompanies the adoption of the malleability of the human brain in 
capitalist management and control. Fideism is supported by the ideological character of 
flexibility that does not treat the plurality of belief as part of a positive project of inclusion, 
but a multiplicity to be exploited as so many markets for the extraction of profit, and to be 
and disciplined into manageable employment practices. But, these constellations do not form 
a tight fit; fideismÕs return to the religious clashes with the technocratic scientism of flexible 
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management. While fideism and flexibility are complementary ideological bedfellows, they 
represent two ideological abstractions with varying relations to science. In the case of 
fideism, Meillassoux claims that mathematic objectivity is necessary for the ruling out of 
unwarranted ideological faith. Contrastingly, Malabou draws on a specific set of scientific 
materials to critique their ideological subversion. Different scientific materials, therefore, are 
necessary for their respective critiques. 
In this light, Meillassoux and MalabouÕs respective understandings of necessity and 
contingency, and the relationship between science and ideology that can be extrapolated from 
their views, are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Each thinker, drawing on 
different materials, highlights the reciprocally re-enforcing aspects of one of these ideological 
formations. Critiques of flexibility and fideism require distinctive scientific materials 
precisely because they relate to science differently. Decisively, the regional character of these 
critiques reveals the disjunction between them. Ideology is not so much a contingent, 
totalising system to be debunked by the necessary truths of science. Rather, there are 
differing forms of ideological abstraction that relate to science in different manners, altering 
the relation between contingency and necessity with respect to those scientific materials. 
What both Malabou and Meillassoux demonstrate is that thinking ideology critique in this 
way requires a form of contingency that inhabits necessity, in order to give credence to a 
form of scientific truth mobilised against ideological distortion. But, to prevent either 
position from falling into a scientific ideologyÐeither that described by Canguilhem or the 
postulation of a strict necessity underlying contingency critiqued by post-structuralismÐit is 
necessary to take their work together. If this path is taken, a multiplicity of tools drawn from 
science can be used to demonstrate the regional and mutable character of ideologyÕs fields of 
operation, showing how the conditions they arise from form the grounds for their critique. 
Necessity and contingency are internal to this understanding of the critique of ideology 
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precisely because such a view requires an acceptance of the mutable yet formative role that 
science has in pitting truth against false abstraction. 
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